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Abstract. This work is devoted to activity recognition in the setting
of data analysis in aeronautics. Formal methods are applied to the cer-
tification and safety analysis processes of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
in breakdown situations. The behaviour of these systems in case of a
failure is entirely modeled and implemented. A temporal language —
the Chronicle language — describes arrangements of events which are
employed to detail undesired circumstances that would lead to breaches
in safety. A C++ chronicle recognition tool is used to recognise all the
possible occurrences of these situations as soon as they occur.
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1 Introduction
One obstacle to the insertion in controlled or uncontrolled airspace of aircrafts
without pilots onboard results from security issues linked to the global consis-
tency of the system. In the framework of operation safety analysis, we assess the
possibility to detect incoherent states between the different entities making up
the system. We formalise these different incoherent states in order to be able to
automatically recognise them, and hence offer the opportunity of a self-acting
surveillance. More specifically, this ongoing work relies on a fragment of the
IDEAS project in charge of the Insertion of Unmanned Aircrafts in Airspace
and Security, and tackles consistency problems in breakdown handling policies
for Unmanned Aircrafts (UA).
An UA is defined by the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) as “an air-
craft that is operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from
within or on the aircraft”. The system required to operate safely an UA is re-
ferred to as an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). There exists several types of
such architectures, and our model is based on the one presented in Fig. 1. It is
composed of three entities, the UA, the Remote Pilot Station (RPS), and the Air
Traffic Control (ATC). All three interact via several communication links. The
RPS pilots the Unmanned Aircraft via Telecommand (TC), and the Unmanned
Aircraft sends information to the pilot through Telemetry (TM). In addition,
the ATC and the pilot can communicate via radio (Voice) relayed by the UA.
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Fig. 1. Architecture of an Unmanned Aircraft System.
Hence, the dynamic data flows between the agents of the system and between
different systems if several UAS are considered are very elaborate. Moreover,
each agent deduces from its own observations the state of the other agents. The
situation in case of a fault can therefore be very complex. Formal methods are
well-suited for monitoring UAS because these systems are highly automated as
well as critical so require strong risk-free guarantees.
In the framework of the IDEAS project, the behaviour of each entity in case
of a failure has been specified [9]. Our work focuses on overseeing the consistency
between the three entities during these rundown story lines.
Consider for instance the following situation: an unmanned aircraft which
telecommand has been poorly working and then completely lost. The conforming
procedure has been followed correctly, and the ATC has activated the urgency
mode corresponding to the rerouting of the aircraft. However, the telecommand
is suddenly restored. The pilot, busy redirecting the UA back to its original
track, forgets to warn the ATC to cancel the urgency procedure. Thus, the ATC
considers the aircraft to be rerouting itself to a given diversion airport while it is
actually taking another route. It is important to be able to identify this situation
which is critical since the ATC, lacking the appropriate information, might not
properly organise the flow of traffic to separate aircrafts and prevent collisions.
2 A Preliminary Semi-Formal Representation
The aim of this work is to provide a tool for automatic monitoring of consistency
in UAS. It is therefore necessary to formally set up the problem. The situation
is standardised into the UML norm [10] as follows.
As a first step, a class diagram is built describing precisely the structure of
the UA as shown in Fig. 2. Each UA X (UA(X)) is seen as made up of several
components: the telecommand (UA(X) TC), the telemetry (UA(X) TM), the autopi-
lot (UA(X) Pilot), the radio relay (UA(X) Relay), and the transponder code it
sends to the ATC (UA(X) Code). Similarly, the associated RPS is composed of
the telecommand (RPS(X) TC), the telemetry (RPS(X) TM) and a connection to
3the ATC (RPS(X)− ATC connection). Note that the smooth functioning of each
end of a given communication link is considered separately so as to be able to
differentiate the state of each entity to identify the source of potential problems
and check for the consistency between the states. For example for the telecom-
mand, the emission of instructions from the pilot, RPS(X) TC, and the reception
of these instructions by the UA, UA(X) TC, are distinguished.
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Fig. 2. Class diagram describing the structure of an UA.
Secondly, so as to exploit the codified behaviours specified in the IDEAS
project, these were translated into state-transition diagrams for each fault. The
first breakdown studied is TC failure presented in Fig. 3: the pilot receives in-
formation from the UA via telemetry but cannot send out orders to it.
With such diagrams, the system is entirely modeled. Its life cycle is mirrored
by the changes in the active states of the diagram. In order to allow direct simu-
lation, the UML diagram is implemented in C++ using the Meta State Machine
(MSM) library [8] of boost (Version 1.48.0) which provides a straightforward way
to define state machines. So as to simulate the life cycle of the system, scenarios
activate the transitions of the diagram.
3 A Recognition Tool
In Sec. 2, the simulation of the system that has to be overseen is described.
This section will now deal with the issue of how to put in place this supervision
4Fig. 3. State-transition diagram describing the system behaviour in case of TC failure.
of the system, the aim being to detect during the simulation critical situations
previously determined by experts.
A temporal language — the chronicle language [5] — is used to formally
describe these system behaviours to oversee the consistency between the three
entities of the UAS. It formally describes arrangements of events: a chronicle is
either a single event, the conjunction of two chronicles, the disjunction of two
chronicles, the sequence of two chronicles or the absence of a chronicle during an-
other chronicle. For instance, let E, F and G be single events, chronicle (E F)− [G]
corresponds to the sequence E F (event E followed by event F) without event G
occurring in between E and F.
This formal language enables us to precisely detail interesting (in our case
undesired) arrangements of events by writing chronicles. Different examples of
applications of this concept may be seen in [6], and [7] offers another approach
dealing with a temporal logic for unmanned aircrafts, but in an execution, rather
than safety, monitoring framework. Subsequently, once appropriate chronicles
are established, all that is left to do in order to supervise the consistency of the
system is to watch for potential recognitions of these chronicles in the event flow.
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RPS rushed decision
( ((to_UA(X)_nominal_flight | | to_UA(X)_transitory_mode) TT )
−[to_UA(X)_rerouting_mode] )
& to_ATC_rerouting_mode_confirmed
where TT is a given delay.
The ATC is in rerouting mode confirmed but UA(X) is not in rerouting
mode.
ATC late
(to_TC_unrecovered TT )
−[to_Urgency_service || to_UA(X)_nominal_TC]
where TT is a given delay.
UA(X) TC changed to TC unrecovered and since then TT minutes have
elapsed without the Urgency service of the ATC being an active state.
ATC incoherent
to_UA(X)_rerouting_mode ((to_ATC_rerouting_mode_inferred D)
−[to_ATC_rerouting_mode_confirmed || to_UA(X)_nominal_flight])
where D is a given delay.
UA(X) changed to rerouting mode. Following that, the ATC inferred the rerout-
ing mode but it was not confirmed by the pilot even after a delay of D min-
utes.
In our work, the set of events considered to build these chronicles are the
entrances in the different possibly active states of the diagram of Fig. 3. Table 1
provides a few examples of chronicles overseeing the consistency of the system
in the case of TC failure. The first chronicle “RPS rushed decision” corresponds
to the example presented in Sect. 1. Chronicle “ATC late” could be triggered by
the following circumstances. Consider an UA which has been periodically losing
its TC link, for instance because of a disruptive environment, and the urgency
transponder code associated to TC failure has been coming on and off. Both the
pilot and the ATC are tired out and less alert, so when the TC is suddenly lost
for good, no one reacts. After a significant delay predefined in its flight plan,
the UA starts to reroute to a diversion airport. If neither the pilot nor the ATC
realise the change in situation other aircrafts might not be sufficiently separated
from the UA which cannot be sent orders to anymore. Recognising the chronicle
would have prevented the possibly dangerous outcome.
For a given chronicle and a given stream of events, we are interested in estab-
lishing the list of all its recognitions gradually as events flow. This requirement
prevents using simple finite state automata [3]. With this design, a recognition
tool called Chronicle Recognition System (CRS/ONERA) has been developed
by the ONERA in the late 1990s [4]. It is designed on the basis of duplicating
automata so as to comply with performance and interoperability requirements.
6In the framework of this Ph.D. thesis, it is interesting to develop a new
recognition tool that directly results from the set semantics of the chronicle
language, since the recognitions produced by this tool are therefore adequate
by construction and no adequacy proof is necessary. This tool, called Chronicle
Recognition Library (CRL), is implemented in C++. Chronicles are plugged into
the program, and then, gradually as events flow in, the program gives the set
of all the recognitions of each chronicle, specifying for each recognition which
events lead to it.
In this implementation, the events are represented as triplets (name, date,
order) where date corresponds to the date of occurrence, and order is distinct
for each event, allowing to sort and order the buffer of events to be processed.
Indeed, two events can occur at the same date but their order is necessarily
different. For instance, two sensors can observe the same system and hence gen-
erate events at the same instants but these will be received by the observing
system in a given order.
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Fig. 4. Syntactic tree corresponding to chronicle (E || F)&G labelled with sub-chronicles.
A recognition of a given chronicle is a set of events leading to it. The recog-
nition method will be illustrated by chronicle (E || F)&G on the buffer of events
{(e, de, 1), (h, dh, 2), (g, dg, 3), (f, df , 4)}. The program processes events from the
event buffer in their order. The recognition process is defined by induction for
each class of chronicle. A key notion in this recognition system is that of sub-
chronicles shown in Fig. 4.
The chronicle to be recognised is seen as a binary tree, the nodes and leaves
of which are respectively operators and single events. The process computes two
sets for every node — and hence for every sub-chronicle — after each event:
the overall recognition set of the sub-chronicle, and its new recognitions set. In
Table 2, both these sets — the new recognitions in green — are presented for
each sub-chronicle and after each event of the buffer. The new recognitions set
is emptied after each processing of an event. It is used to make sure to only add
new recognitions to the recognition set — and hence avoid doubles — and to
determine if there will be new recognitions in the ancestors of the node.
The recognition set of the chronicle is the recognition set of the root of the
tree. In our example, after having processed all four events, there are two recogni-
tions and the final recognition set is {{(e, de, 1), (g, dg, 3)}, {(g, dg, 3), (f, df , 4)}}.
Note that event (g, dg, 3) is in both recognitions.
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(e, de, 1) (h, dh, 2) (g, dg, 3) (f, df , 4)
E
{{(e, de, 1)}}
{{(e, de, 1)}}
{{(e, de, 1)}}
{}
{{(e, de, 1)}}
{}
{{(e, de, 1)}}
{}
F
{}
{}
{}
{}
{}
{}
{{(f, df , 4)}}
{{(f, df , 4)}}
E || F
{{(e, de, 1)}}
{{(e, de, 1)}}
{{(e, de, 1)}}
{}
{{(e, de, 1)}}
{}
{{(e, de, 1)}, {(f, df , 4)}}
{{(f, df , 4)}}
G
{}
{}
{}
{}
{{(g, dg, 3)}}
{{(g, dg, 3)}}
{{(g, dg, 3)}}
{}
(E || F)
&G
{}
{}
{}
{}
{{(e, de, 1), (g, dg, 3)}}
{{(e, de, 1), (g, dg, 3)}}
{{(e, de, 1), (g, dg, 3)},
{(g, dg, 3), (f, df , 4)}}
{{(g, dg, 3), (f, df , 4)}}
The current work on the development of CRL is to take into account delay
constraints, e.g. TT in chronicle ATC late. Mirroring Allen’s interval logic [1],
delays are added to the chronicle language to be able to express duration of
chronicles (lasts δ, at most δ, and at least δ — where δ is a delay) and
delays after chronicles (then δ). It is clear that the system must be observed at
each occurrence of an event. However, for chronicle C then δ, this is not enough
and the question of when to examine the system is raised. Indeed, it cannot be
constantly looked over. This is a general issue once continuous time and discrete
events have to coexist. Different approaches have been put forward to address
this problem, notably [2].
A first necessary step for this ongoing work is therefore to define a function
which, for both a given chronicle and the past events that have been observed,
returns the next time at which the system has to be checked for a new recogni-
tion. This can be seen as a sort of validity contract, which can be directly linked
to distributed simulations since these carry messages with validity domains. This
question of validity is indeed strongly present in distributed simulations for aero-
nautics but also in certain formal methods for dynamic systems.
4 Conclusion and perspectives
In this paper, a temporal language is used to monitor safety for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems in case of breakdowns, which is a problem of particularly great
importance in the field of civil aviation. The behaviour of the UAS is completely
modeled in a UML diagram which is implemented in C++, and a C++ library
allows direct analysis of simulation data.
Chronicles and the associated recognition model shall be extended to improve
the expressivity of the framework, in particular with delay-related constructs
inspired from interval logics. The UAS application previously exposed tackles the
crucial problem of the insertion of UAS in controlled or uncontrolled airspace and
8the associated certification and safety analysis processes. As presented in this
paper, chronicle recognition can be used as a crucial tool to analyse simulation
as the design stage of an UAS. It is also well-suited for the on-line analysis
of real-time situations to generate alarms and avoid risky situations. This first
step deals with physical failures in one aircraft but there are other issues, as
separation and collision avoidance which are the cornerstone of flight safety. A
model for this is currently being developed in collaboration with UAS engineers.
Chronicles, already applied to a wide variety of different fields, are shown to
be an adequate generic means to represent knowledge in a multi-agent system,
and, as such, benefit to a large spectrum of applications. Moreover, the insertion
of UAS into general airspace raises concerns that cannot be solved without a
formal representation which chronicles seem to fulfil fairly.
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